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I.

STATEMENT OF CASE

This is an appeal from a decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission which found that
the Claimant was not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits from the remaining
Defendant, State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (hereinafter "ISIF''). The
Employer/Surety settled with the Claimant shortly before hearing. The Claimant injured his left
wrist in January of 2007 when he fell on ice and landed on his outstretched hands. Claimant is
left hand dominant. He was thirty-four years old and working as a plumber when the slip and fall
occurred.
The Industrial Commission found that Smith failed to meet his burden of proof as to total
and permanent disability, either by the one hundred percent (100%) method or as an odd-lot
worker. The decision found that the Claimant's main impediment to work is his psychological
condition which is treatable.
Shortly after relocating from California to Coeur d'Alene, the Claimant slipped on ice
while working for his time-of-injury employer Garland Construction Services and sustained an
injury to his left hand. This seemingly straight forward case involves a sprain to the wrist and a
minor surgical procedure to remove a fragment of bone. Now eleven (11) years later the
Claimant remains involved in litigation before the Idaho Industrial Commission and now the
Idaho Supreme Court. There is little evidence the Claimant is totally and permanently disabled
other than the Claimant's own self-serving testimony.

Central to this case is Claimant's

propensity to be untruthful. Both the Idaho Industrial Commission and two Referees found the
Claimant not credible.
The Claimant and the Employer/Surety went to the first hearing in 2008 over the issue of
whether Claimant was entitled to medical benefits for psychological injuries that allegedly

resulted from the January 2007 industrial accident. (Claimant's Ex. K, p. 358). The Findings
made by the Referee at that time indicate that the Claimant was not truthful to his medical
providers, abused marijuana and his wrist injury was not the predominant cause of his
psychological condition. The Commission held that Claimant was not entitled to benefits for
psychological injures pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72-450.

Dr. Ronald Klein, Ph.D

Psychologist, who performed a psychological evaluation of the Claimant at the request of the
employer/surety summarized his findings concerning the Claimant's long-term personality and
adjustment disorder in 2008 and his lack of credibility:
CLINICAL IMPRESSIONS:
Adjustment Disorder with anxious and depressed features
Axis I:
Axis II:
Mixed Personality Disorder with emotionally dependent and
narcissistic features
Axis III:
Wrist Injury and previous bilateral heel injuries
Ads IV:
Significant financial, occupational and family functioning stresses
Axis V:
Global Assessment of Function= 45
Neither his adjustment disorder or his personality disorder are causally related to
the 01/15/2007 work injury. Rather they are long-standing characteristics of his
functioning that were in place by late adolescence and continued to be
demonstrated during his early adulthood, all predating January 2007. Having
reviewed his records prior to evaluating him in my office. and noting the times
when he knowingly gave untruthful statements or deliberately withheld
information from treating mental health providers, I felt the two most likely
explanations of his behavior were I) that he was a habitual liar who even gave
false information to persons trying to help him, or 2) that he was psychotic and
didn't always know what he was saying or the ramifications of what he was
saying. However, once I had the chance to sit down with him and evaluate him
directly, I realized that neither of those two possibilities were correct. Instead,
Kevin Smith functions very much like a child and a maladjusted child at that,
impulsive, self-focused, oblivious to others' needs and irritated at being held
accountable for his actions. He feels that others misunderstand him and that he
doesn't have to participate in adult responsibilities if he really doesn't want to.
Examples of all this are found in his records and today's evaluation, and noted in
the present report. When he tells a falsehood, he appears to be responding to the
impulse of the moment, doesn't appear to focus on the long term implications or
ramifications of what he is saying, hopes not to be held accountable for what he
says, and when he is held accountable or is challenged about it, reverts to his
no/yes/no/I don't know pattern of responding while appearing agitated and
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irritated, with himself and with the person taking him to task. Regarding his
participation in legal processes, his verbal statements are of variable reliability
and it doesn't appear to be terribly different if he is under oath or not.
ISIF Exhibit 4, p. 66.
Claimant was hired by Garland Construction as a plumber in November of 2006, less
than two months prior to the industrial accident. Claimant fell on ice injuring his wrist outside of
a remodel job. (Claimant's Ex. 5). The Claimant was seen by Dr. Richard Mattis at North Idaho
Family Physicians on the same day as the industrial accident. (Claimant's Ex. 3, p. 1002). The
initial CT scan was negative for any acute fracture. (Claimant's Ex. 3, p. 1008). He continued to
see Dr. Mattis; on January 23, 2007 indicating he was getting better and was continuing to work
at his employer, although not yet at full duty. (Claimant's Ex. 3, p. 1011). Claimant was seen
again in February of 2007 and continued working on light duty. (Claimant's Ex. 3, p. 1017).
By March of 2007, the Claimant had been referred to hand specialist, Dr. Peter Jones of
Coeur d'Alene, ID. (Claimant's Ex. 3, p. 1021). Dr. Jones' initial impression was scapholunate
ligament tear and avulsion fracture off the lunate bone. (Claimant's Ex. 6, p. 2001). Dr. Jones
recommended surgical exploration of the wrist with excision of the lunate fracture fragment and
repair of the ligament.
An independent medical exam was performed by Joseph D. Welch, MD who made a
diagnosis of a sprained left wrist with a CT finding of an old lunate chip fracture, nothing acute.
(ISIF Ex. 10, p. 121). Dr. Welch indicated that he would recommend holding off on surgery and
indicated that more time needs to go by to see if the Claimant could improve further. (ISIF Ex.
10, p. 122).
The Claimant underwent a second independent medical evaluation by Dr. Welch in June
of 2007 and again reiterated that the Claimant did not have an acute injury to the left wrist as a
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result of the industrial accident. (ISIP Ex. 11, p. 130). The diagnosis remained the same of an
old chip fracture.
The Claimant saw Dr. Jones in June of 2007 who was equivocal as to whether or not the
avulsion fracture was as a result of the industrial accident or predated it. (Claimant's Ex. 6, p.
2006).

Surgery was performed by Dr. Jones on July 11, 2007 and he identified a fracture

fragment off the lunate bone that was excised. The scapholunate ligament however was intact
and repair was not necessary. (Claimant's Ex. 6, p. 2007).
The Claimant was last seen a final time by Dr. Peter Jones in November of 2007 (10
months after the industrial accident) who indicated that the Claimant was slowly improving with
regard to his wrist range of motion and wrist pain. The last release from Dr. Jones was a
temporary release from September to November of 2007 which indicated the Claimant could
return to his employment with no lifting over five pounds and minimal use of the left hand and
wrist. (Claimant Ex. 6, p. 2012). This appears to be the last information concerning restrictions
directly related to the Claimant's wrist.
A third IME was performed by Dr. James Brinkman who indicated in September of 2007,
nine months after the industrial accident, that the Claimant was able to return to work with
restrictions of not lifting anything greater than 10-20 pounds with both hands and 10 pounds with
the left on an occasional basis. He also indicated that six (6) months post surgery, which would
be in December of 2007, the Claimant should be returned to work without restrictions.
(Claimant's Ex. 9, p. 5033). Since the Claimant was not at maximum medical improvement
according to Dr. Brinkman, he deferred an impairment rating. Dr. Brinkman also indicated that
the scapholunate fracture fragment was not the result of the January 2007 injury but was more
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probable than not, an exacerbation. (Claimant's Ex. 9, p. 5032). However, Dr. Brinkman noted
that the Claimant appeared almost suicidal during the September 2007 exam.
The final independent medical evaluation in this case occurred in December 2007 by Dr.
Joseph Welch.

Dr. Welch provided the Claimant with a 9% impairment of the left upper

extremity. Dr. Welch continued to have doubts as to whether or not the lunate fracture was
caused by the industrial accident:
I believe that the physical injury was one of a sprain to the left wrist and probably
a pre-existing or, one could argue, aggravated lunate fracture. He is now status
post surgery. I think that it would be reasonable to accept that as industrial
related.
Claimant's Exhibit 9, p. 5041.
Dr. Welch indicated that the Claimant would not be able to return to work until his
psychiatric issues were addressed. (ISIF Ex. 13, p. 155).
Nevertheless, after significant medical treatment and a total of four independent medical
evaluations it is clear that the Claimant had a wrist strain and possibly, but only possibly, a
lunate fracture fragment that was excised during surgery.
The Claimant received substantial mental health assistance, including referral to
psychiatrist David B. Wait (Claimant's Ex. 13) ongoing treatment at Region 1 Mental Health,
including working with Emily Hart, M.Ed and a licensed clinical social worker, Jill Megow,
LCSW. (Claimant's Ex. 14 and 15).
A report from Region 1 Mental Health (Claimant's Ex. E) indicated in August 2008, a
diagnosis of major depression but also noted cannabis abuse, personality disorder with
compulsive, histrionic and anti-social features.

The report also noted that Claimant refused

medications and that the marijuana was of concern and exacerbating the Claimant's mood
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difficulties. (Claimant's Ex. E, p. 68). Also noted in the report was concern that the ongoing
litigation was complicating the Claimant's recovery. (Claimant's Ex. E, p. 68).
The Claimant continued to use the services of Region 1 Mental Health throughout 2008
and into 2009.

The Claimant reported legal charges in Oregon also involving marijuana

possession. (Claimant's Ex. E, p. 99).
The Claimant was referred to the Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Office in Coeur
d'Alene and had his initial interview in October of 2007. (ISIF Ex. 1, p. 2). A job site evaluation
was submitted to Dr. Joseph Welch in December of 2007, who did not approve the job site
evaluation of service technician plumber because the psychiatric issues involving depression
needed to be addressed. (ISIF Ex. 1, p. 13). Dr. Welch noted that the restrictions were not
permanent and were largely psychiatric. (ISIF Ex. 1, p. 14). The records of the Industrial
Commission Rehabilitation Department also demonstrate numerous attempts by consultant Reed
to contact the Claimant, which were to no avail. February 4, 2008 the Claimant failed to show
for his scheduled appointment. (ISIF Ex. 1, p. 15). In June of 2008, the Claimant again failed to
show for his scheduled appointment. (ISIF Ex. 1, p. 16). The Claimant's case was closed by the
ICRD office because the Claimant indicated he did not wish to pursue employment and that he
was planning to enter inpatient mental health treatment. (ISIF Ex. 1, p. 16). The Claimant's case
was reopened by the ICRD office in December of 2008 when the Claimant contacted consultant
Reed and asked for assistance with vocational issues. An appointment was scheduled and again
the Claimant failed to show for his scheduled appointment. (ISIF Ex. 1, p. 18).
The first hearing in this case occurred in October of 2008 and the Referee issued his
decision in April of 2009 which was adopted by the Industrial Commisison. The Referee noted
that the Claimant was dishonest with his medical providers on several occasions. The Referee
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found that, while the Claimant's psychological condition was genuine, the Claimant did not
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the wrist injury was the predominant cause of his
psychological condition. (Claimant's Ex. K, pp. 374-375).
The Referee also noted that based upon testing by Dr. Rehnberg, the Claimant tested in
the top 20% nationally for intelligence. (Claimant's Ex. K, p. 371). In Dr. Rehnberg's opinion,
the Claimant is capable of college level training. The Referee also noted that Dr. Rehnberg
administered SIMS testing to Claimant which revealed a score of 18, suggestive of malingering.
(Claimant's Ex. K, p. 371).
The Claimant's wife testified that Claimant smoked marijuana almost daily while living
in Reno and maybe almost daily while living in Lake Tahoe. (Claimant's Ex. K, p. 362).
On the issue of credibility, the Commission adopted the Referee's findings:
Claimant has been dishonest with his medical providers on several occasions
regarding several subjects. His lack of credibility restrains the weight given to his
complaints and the weight which can be given to medical opinions rendered in
reliance upon the credibility of his complaints.
Claimant's Ex. K, p. 373.
Having observed Claimant at hearing, and carefully examined the record herein,
the Referee finds that Claimant is not a credible witness. Claimant's two positive
marijuana tests at MHS, his charge for possession of marijuana in Oregon, and
finally his admission on August 4, 2008, that he was struggling with quitting
marijuana indicate that Claimant has not been truthful about the extent of his
marijuana abuse. Claimant has also been intentionally untruthful with several of
his counselors on multiple occasions, including Emily Hart, Dr. Waite, Dr.
Parkman, and also to a lesser extent Drs. Rehnberg and Klein, regarding his past
residences, past and current drug abuse, and exposure to past physical abuse.
Taken collectively, these instances of dishonesty indicate that Claimant fabricates,
at least occasionally, when he perceives it is to his advantage to mislead.
Claimant's Ex. K, p. 366.
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Beginning in the fall of 2009, with the assistance of the Idaho Department of Vocational
Rehabilitation, the Claimant began attending North Idaho College. After two years, the Claimant
had completed 4 7 credits of college level classes. (ISIF Ex. 8, p. 110). At hearing, the Claimant
acknowledged that he was 13 credits short of an AA degree. (Tr. p. 71 (05/17/16)).
In February of 2011 he was treated in the emergency room at Kootenai Medical Center
extremely stressed due to finding out his wife was cheating. (Claimant's Ex. J, p. 344).
The Claimant returned to California in 2012 (Tr. p. 721 (05/17/16)) after he separated
from his wife. He was hospitalized for depression in San Bernardino, California in August of
2012. (Claimant's Ex. W). At that time, he was voluntarily admitted with a depressive disorder,
the treatment involved was prompted by having problems with his spouse and the ongoing
divorce.

He was seen in California at Desert Behavioral Health. (Claimant's Ex. X). Most of

the treatment in California seemed to be focused on his divorce and his feelings towards his
former spouse, Julie. (Claimant's Ex. X).
Other post accident medical treatment include a sprained ankle playing baseball
(Claimant's Ex. J, p. 373) a visit with an orthopedic surgeon in April of 2011 concerning a right
shoulder injury that occurred while moving furniture. (Claimant's Ex. P, p. 419). Interestingly,
in Dr. King's physical examination of the Claimant, he noted no major deformity and functional
range of motion and strength of the left upper extremity, including the shoulder and elbow.
(Claimant Ex. P, p. 420). The chart note also indicates that the Claimant continues to engage in
throwing and overhead activities. (Claimant Ex. P, p. 419). Also in 2011, he reported upper
back pain caused by lifting a tire and sleeping on a sofa. (Claimant's Ex. Q).

8

When the Claimant consulted Dr. Roger C. Ehlert in April of 2011 he was in shock and
deeply grieving relationship issues with his wife.

The diagnosis was shock, situational

depression, major rage. Dr. Ehlert met with the Claimant for 20 one hour outpatient visits.
(Claimant's Ex. R, p. 423). Dr. Ehlert noted in February 2012:
Generally, his self-care improved over 20 one hour outpatient visits. He would be
capable of managing his own funds, understanding written documents, and
following treatment plans. His intelligence was a least average. He had many
strengths and we focused upon these strengths and the development of emotional
resiliency as part of the treatment plan.
Claimant's Exhibit R, p. 423
The Claimant also sought counseling through North Idaho College. This again was in 2011 and
again the Claimant appeared to be upset, in tears, and was in a crisis situation related to marital
issues. (Claimant Ex. T, p. 431).
Claimant's psychological care and mental health treatment after he returned to California
m 2012 focused on situational depression and rage related to the divorce from his wife.
(Claimant's Ex. R, p. 423).
Claimant was treated by Dr. Puri a psychiatrist in Victorville, California in 2012,
complaining that his wife cheated on him and left him and that he has been depressed.
(Claimant's Ex. V, p. 464). The Claimant also began counseling with Desert Behavioral Health.
(Claimant's Ex. X). He presented as agitated, tearful and on edge. (Claimant's Ex. X, p. 584).
The focus of the counseling involved family issues, including his children and former spouse. An
annual exam done in March of 2014 in California indicated that the Claimant had decreased
energy levels and stress brought on by an ongoing family situation involving his wife.
(Claimant's Ex. Y, p. 610).
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Psychiatrist Thaworn Rathana-Nakintara, MD noted in 2012 that the Claimant's
prognosis was good and that he "would have no difficulties to be able to handle the usual
stresses, changes and demands of gainful employment." R. p. 215
There are no records of any medical treatment concerning the Claimant's left wrist since
he returned to California in 2012, nor his lower extremities.
The Claimant admitted that in the four years he had been in California, he made one trip
to Victorville College. (Tr. p. 72 (2116)). He further admitted that he first contacted California
Vocational Rehabilitation 6-8 weeks prior to the Idaho Industrial hearing in 2016. (Tr. p. 73
(05/17/16)). The Claimant further admitted that he had only been registered with the job service
in California for two months prior to the hearing in 2016. (Tr. p. 74 (05/17/16)). The Claimant
admitted at hearing that he had not applied for any jobs since he returned to California. (Tr. p. 92
(05/17/16)).
Basically in the four years the Claimant has been in California, he performed no job
search, did not contact a college until shortly before the hearing in 2016 and had not registered
for the job service. The Claimant disputed the results of the functional capacity evaluation at the
time of the hearing, indicating that he wasn't present for 7 Yi hours and disputed the
measurements of his standing, walking or sitting. (Tr. p. 79 (05/17/16)). He also denied lifting
any weights. (Tr. pp. 80-81 (05/17/16)). He even suggested that the FCE results were for
someone else.
The Claimant hired Dan Brownell as a vocational witness who provided a report and post
hearing deposition which indicated that in his opinion, the Claimant was totally disabled as an
Odd-Lot worker based on futility. (Brownell Dep. 35:16). Mr. Brownell admitted that he used
the 2007 physical restrictions from Drs. Jones, Brinkman, and Welch. (Brownell Dep. 36:21).
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Mr. Brownell went on to indicate that if the Claimant only had a wrist injury, he would still be
employable. (Brownell Dep. 38:16). Mr. Brownell does not explain in his report or anywhere in
his deposition how the bilateral heel injuries impact the Claimant or contribute to his disability.
Moreover, there is no information in the record as to restrictions related to the Claimant's
bilateral heel injuries. The Claimant admitted that he was successful as a plumber for 10 years.
(Tr. p. 83 (05/17/16)). He admitted that he had no treatment for his heels since the late 1990s.
(Tr. p. 84 (05/17/16)). He admitted to doing heavy work as a plumber, including installation of
water heaters and removing sinks. (Tr. p. 83 (05/17/16)).

The evidence is that for 10 years

after his bilateral heel injuries he successfully performed work as a plumber.
On cross examination, Mr. Brownell admitted that the Claimant was only 13 credits shy
of an AA degree. (Brownell Dep. 49:22-24). Mr. Brownell further admitted that the Claimant
was intelligent and that completing an AA degree would make the Claimant more competitive.
(Brownell Dep., p. 49:11-12). After a somewhat extended colloquy, Mr. Brownell admitted that
the Claimant was able to obtain a skilled plumbing position with on the job training. (Brownell
Dep. 52:7-13).
Mr. Brownell completely discounted the functional capacity evaluation done at the
Claimant's attorney's request. He admitted that if the functional capacity evaluation was valid,
that the Claimant could perform medium duty work. (Brownell Dep. 60:13-17). He further
admitted that if the report were valid, it would not be futile for the Claimant to search for work.
(Brownell Dep. 60: 18-21 ). Mr. Brownell admitted that a second functional capacity evaluation
would have been a good idea. He further admitted that the temporary medical restrictions he
used from Drs. Brinkman, Welch and Jones were nine or ten years old. (Brownell Dep. 61 :1821 ). Mr. Brownell admitted that he recommended that the Claimant connect with Vocational
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Rehabilitation in California. (Brownell Dep. 62: 1-5). Mr. Brownell further admitted that as of
2016, Mr. Smith had not been formally accepted into California Vocational Rehabilitation.
(Brownell Dep. 62:15-18).
Testifying on behalf of Defendant ISIF was William Jordan, vocational expert. Mr.
Jordan, in his deposition testimony, and in his report (ISIP Ex. 16) indicated that most of the
medical information concerning the Claimant's wrist injury, including information from Drs.
Brinkman, Welch and Jones, came in 2007. (Jordan Dep. 20:14-17). Mr. Jordan indicated that
the Claimant didn't have any permanent restrictions from a physician (Jordan Dep. 20:22-25).
Mr. Jordan indicated that the functional capacity evaluation done in California in 2014 was the
most up to date medical information available regarding the Claimant. (Jordan Dep. 21 :5-7).
Interestingly, when the Claimant was interviewed by Mr. Jordan in 2016 for the purposes
of this case, the Claimant continued to misrepresent his background in the United State Army.
(Jordan Dep. 34: 11-15). Mr. Jordan indicated that if the Claimant completed an AA degree that
would assist him in finding employment because it demonstrates to an employer that they have a
person they can work with and develop. (Jordan Dep. 35:5-13). The summary portion of Mr.
Jordan's report concludes:
Certainly, if one relies on the Evaluee's perception of his capacity and his
psychological status, it is not likely he would be capable of any forms of
employment, and a declaration of total and permanent disability could be
considered by the Idaho Industrial Commission, however, the analysis of
permanent disability is clouded by the fidelity issues the Evaluee has
demonstrated throughout the course of the claim. As reflected in the records, his
ongoing propensity to provide inconsistent reports to various providers and the
frank dishonesty he has shown during the process makes it difficult to sort out the
issues. [emphasis added]. That said, there are no medical opinions in the file
information that reflects the Evaluee is incapable of working. While he had a
manifest pre-existing impairment with respect to his bilateral ankles, and it was a
hindrance to his employment, he was still able to engage in and maintain gainful
employment after that injury. Likewise, while he may have had a pre-existing
personality disorder, there is no evidence of any prior psychological issues that
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were manifest/resulted in his inability to secure and maintain gainful employment.
The most recent psychiatric evaluation outlines the Evaluee is capable of working
with respect to his psychological condition. In fact, the counseling that he has
received in both Idaho and California typically focused on pursuit of a vocational
objective and/or employment as a means to assist him in becoming a functional
member of the community. There is no documented permanent partial impairment
concerning the psychological issues. Just as with the ankle injuries, there are no
physician documented restrictions for the 2007 wrist injury. The Evaluee's FCE of
2014 reflects a worsening of his left wrist condition, but does not reflect
limitations that would render him incapable of any and all work. He is not
restricted in any way with regard to his right upper extremity, and he
demonstrated a capacity to stand and walk for 6-8 hours out of an 8 hour day. In
fact, the recommendations in that FCE report reflected that he would be capable
of returning to work as a Plumbing Service Technician. The Evaluee himself has
indicated that he felt he could do the Service Manager work (if he did not have to
go out into the field.) Those types of opportunities exist, especially in the
Evaluee's current California labor market. In addition, there are a number of other
types of occupations for which he would be qualified to perform such as
plumbing and construction material supply sales, customer service work, etc. (as
outlined above in the labor market section of this report.)
As such there is no combination of pre-existing impairment with the subsequent
injury to cause total disability.
ISIF Ex. 16, p. 224-225.
II.

A.

ARGUMENT

Standard of Review

"When reviewing a decision by the Industrial Commission, the Supreme Court exercises free
review over the Commission's conclusions of law, but will not disturb the Commission's factual
findings if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence." Serrano v. Four Seasons
Framing, 157 Idaho 309,314,336 P.3d 242,247 (2014) (quoting Knowlton v. Wood River Med
Ctr., 151 Idaho 135, 140, 254 P.3d 36, 41 (2011)); see Idaho Code Section 72-732. "Substantial

evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 305, 179 P.3d 265, 268 (2008)
(quoting Ewins v. Allied Sec., 138 Idaho 343, 346, 63 P.3d 469, 472 (2003)). "This Court views
all facts and inferences 'in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed before the
13

Commission.' "Id. (quoting Taylor v. Soran Rest., Inc., 131 Idaho 525, 527, 960 P.2d 1254,
1256 (1998)). "This Court will not re-weigh the evidence and '[t]he Commission's conclusions
regarding the credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed unless they are clearly
erroneous.' " Serrano, 157 Idaho at 314, 336 P.3d at 247 (alteration in original) (quoting

Knowlton, 151 Idaho at 140, 254 P .3d at 41 ).

B.

Claimant Is Not 100% Disabled

The Claimant argues that he is disabled under both the Odd-Lot Doctrine and as a 100%
disabled Claimant. "There are two ways in which a claimant can establish a total and permanent
disability: (1) by proving that his or her medical impairment and non-medical factors caused him
or her to become 100% disabled; or (2) by proving that he or she is an odd-lot employee." Magee

v. Thompson Creek Mining Co., 142 Idaho 761, 764-65, 133 PJd 1226, 1229-30 (2006). Most
of the argument in the Claimant's brief is addressed toward the Odd-Lot Doctrine but the Claimant
does assert that he is 100% disabled due to his bilateral heel injuries and his left hand injury and
psychological condition.
Claimant is clearly not 100% disabled since there is no medical information in the record
where any medical provider has indicated that the Claimant cannot return to the work force. In fact,
the medical information in the record contains only temporary restrictions from Drs. Brinkman and
Welch, and the treating surgeon, Peter Jones who all indicate that the Claimant can return to
employment, albeit with restrictions.
The last restriction from Dr. Jones is in November 2007 and indicates that the Claimant
could work with minimal use of his left hand and wrist. (Claimant's Ex. 6, p. 2012). Dr. Brinkman
indicated that the Claimant was not at maximum medical improvement in September of 2007 and
could work with restrictions of 10-20 lbs. lifting and 10 lbs. on the left on an occasional basis.
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(Claimant's Ex. 9, p. 5033). He anticipated no permanent restrictions, although he felt the Claimant
needed additional time post surgery. (Claimant's Ex. 9, p. 5033). In December of 2007, Dr. Welch
indicated that the Claimant needed to have his psychiatric issues addressed before he could return to
employment.

(Claimant's Ex. 9, p. 5042). There is no indication that Dr. Welch was giving

permanent restrictions of any type as a result of the December 2007 exam he performed.
The most recent information on physical capability is a 2014 functional capacity evaluation
which indicates that the Claimant can perform medium level work, could return to a position as a
plumber and there are no restrictions concerning sit, stand, walk and keyboarding. The Referee and
the Commission had questions concerning the 2014 FCE but discounted Claimant's testimony
disputing the FCE. The Referee used the raw data from the FCE on grip strength, lifting ability,
shoulder and back movement ranges and ankle range of movement. The raw data does not support
a finding of an individual who lacks physical capabilities and directly contradicts Claimant's own
subjective limitations . The FCE is wholly inconsistent with a finding of 100% disability. (ISIF Ex.
14). With the medical records available in this case, it is clear that the Claimant is not a 100%
disabled individual as that concept is understood in Idaho law. In fact, the evidence is that the
Claimant can and should return to full time work and that his mental health would improve with
employment.

C.

Claimant is Not an Odd Lot Worker

The Commission also concluded that Smith failed to meet his status as an odd-lot
employee. The odd-lot doctrine expands disability by recognizing that total disability does not
mean "the injured person must be absolutely helpless or entirely unable to do anything worthy of
compensation" but "[a]n employee who is so injured that he can perform no services other than
those which are so limited in quality, dependability or quantity that a reasonably stable market
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for them does not exist may well be classified as totally disabled." Bybee v. State, Indus. Special
lndem. Fund, 129 Idaho 76, 81, 921 P.2d 1200, 1205 (1996) (quoting Arnold v. Splendid Bakery,

88 Idaho 455,463,401 P.2d 271,276 (1965)). The claimant bears the burden of proving a prima
facie case of odd-lot status, which requires: (1) that the claimant "attempted other types of
employment without success;" or (2) that the claimant, "or vocational counselors or employment
agencies on his or her behalf, have searched for other work and other work is not available; or
(3) that any efforts to find suitable employment would be futile." Goo by v. Lake Shore Mgmt.

Co., 136 Idaho 79, 83, 29 P.3d 390, 394 (2001).
Under the first method, Claimant was required to show that he attempted other types of
employment without success. The evidence shows that Claimant has never been employed since
shortly after his industrial accident. Simply put, this method of establishing odd-lot disability is
not available in this case since the Claimant has never re-entered the work force.
Under the second method, Claimant is required to show that he, or others on his behalf,
searched for work and that none was available. Claimant testified that he has not looked for work
since his accident and did nothing to look for work or improve his employability in the four
years since he was in California between 2012 and the 2016 hearing. At hearing he admitted he
submitted no job applications in California, had not signed up with the employment office, and
had only recently contacted Vocational Rehabilitation.

In the eleven (11) years since his

industrial accident, the Claimant has not filled out a single job application. (ISIF Exhibit 16, p.
218).
The Claimant cites testimony of his wife from 2008 to support his position that he
searched for work and could not find it. Yet, after two full hearings and eleven years there is no
evidence of an identified place of employment that Claimant has made application for.
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The Claimant also refers to Idaho Vocational records from 2008 when he applied for their
services. The restrictions used by Vocational Rehabilitation are based on the Claimant's own
subjective complaints which lack credibility.

The Idaho Department of Vocational Rehab

records indicate no prolonged walking or standing, limited bend/kneel/sit/stand/stoop or twist;
again all subjective and without any medical documentation.
The question in this case comes down to whether or not it is futile for the Claimant to
attempt to find suitable employment in the Apple Valley, California area. The Claimant is a
young man, 44 years of age, with a high school education and 47 credits of community college.
He tests in the upper 20% of the national population on an intellectual basis.

He has

demonstrated that he can obtain a skilled position with on the job training as a plumber. He is in
a good labor market with numerous job opportunities in southern California.

If anything,

Claimant is the epitome of someone who is not an Odd-Lot worker. Moreover, the evidence in
this case from the 2014 functional capacity evaluation is that the Claimant can in fact perform
most physical activities. His only significant restriction being left hand grasping.
The Industrial Commission found that the Claimant did not meet the burden of proof to
establish either odd-lot or 100% disability:
44.
No physician has opined Claimant is permanently incapable of
employment. Claimant has been given various restrictions for his physical
injuries. While the record contains more than one expert opinion that Claimant
will have a difficult time finding employment unless and until his psychological
issues are treated, no expert has opined that Claimant's psychological condition is
not treatable, and therefore a stable, permanent barrier to employment.
45.
Claimant testified that with professional job-seeking assistance he is "very
hopeful" he can return to employment. Alternatively, he feels he may be able to
finish his college education, which in tum would assist him in finding work. Lack
of funds held Claimant back from seeking to finish his education started at North
Idaho College. Settlement with the surety in this matter has provided Claimant
funds, and he is open to the idea of continuing his education if so advised by his
counselor.
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46.
Claimant's heels have not stopped him from obtaining employment. While
he subjectively claims his left wrist injury makes it impossible for him to continue
as a plumber, he has transferable skills. Also, the true extent of Claimant's current
left wrist impairment is not clear from the medical record. At this time, Claimant's
greatest impediment to employment is not physical, but psychological. With
proper psychological treatment, it is more likely than not that Claimant would or
should be able to find employment in the Apple Valley, California labor market,
as discussed in greater detail below.
Findings
D.

of Fact,

Conclusions

of Law

and

Recommendation,

R.

pp.

157-158.

Claimant's Psychological Makeup Was Properly Considered.

The Claimant's contention is that, based on Ford v. Concrete Placing Company, Inc., IC
2005-518336 (November 6, 2014), the Commission is required to consider the psychological
status of the Claimant when making a determination of disability. In Ford the Commission
found that the psychological makeup of a Claimant, who could not interact positively with
members of the public, was a factor to consider in determining overall disability. In Ford this
was more a personality style as opposed to a treatable mental condition. The commission noted
that in Ford there was no discussion of whether or not the psychological condition was
permanent. The Commission stated that it did not consider a temporary psychological condition
capable of treatment a factor to be considered in determining permanent and total disability. R.
p. 172. The Commission noted as follows:
By all accounts, the significant psychological problems worsened after his
industrial accident, were aggravated by marital issues, and have remained until
now inadequately treated.
R. p. 172.

The Commission found that the Claimant's current psychological condition and
depression were not a permanent factor to consider, but rather a treatable condition.

The

Claimant himself testified at hearing that he was open to returning to school with the settlement
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money received from the Surety and that he was "very hopeful" he could return to work with
help. (Tr. p. 86). Apparently even the Claimant agreed that his return to work attempt would not
be futile. The Commission found that the Claimant did not meet his burden of establishing that it
would be futile for him to seek employment and therefore he could not be considered totally and
permanently disabled pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine. R. p. 173.
Part and parcel of the Commission's decision however is Claimant's lack of credibility.
The Commission was not willing to adopt the Claimant's subjective complaints ofleft wrist pain
and immobility causing total disability.

E.

ISIF's Proposed Exhibit 17

At hearing the Referee sustained an objection to the admissibility of ISIF proposed
Exhibit 17. The Exhibit was never admitted into evidence, but it was used by vocational expert,
William Jordan in his report and was directly referenced in his report which was admitted in its
entirety as ISIF Exhibit 16. Exhibit 17 actually was furnished to the ISIF in discovery by the
Claimant. As such, Claimant cannot complain as to the use of the psychological reports by Mr.
Jordan; both on the basis of Idaho Rule of Evidence 703 and on the fact that Mr. Jordan's report
in its entirety was admitted as an exhibit.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 703 provides that an expert opinion (such as that of William
Jordan) can be based upon facts or data that need not be admissible in evidence in order to admit
the opinion of the expert. The only qualification is that the facts or data must be of a type
reasonable relied upon by experts in a particular field. This case is replete with psychological
and mental health counseling records used by both vocational experts. Both vocational experts
referred to the medical and mental health records in their deposition testimony. ISIF Exhibit 17
should have been admitted as evidence since its probative value is helpful to decide the case and
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the Claimant is not prejudiced. It was the Claimant who initially located and produced the
exhibit and obviously knew about it but chose not to include the exhibit as part of its set of
exhibits.
The Referee specifically noted that he did not consider or rely upon the report
independently of Mr. Jordan's analysis, but considered Mr. Jordan's analysis in its entirety.
Findings of Fact, R. p. 166.
The case law is clear that a trier of fact may, in its discretion, allow an expert to render
opinion based in part upon hearsay or other inadmissible evidence. This is allowed as long as the
expert testifies as to the specific basis of his opinion and reaches an opinion based upon his own
independent judgment. Doty v. Bishara, 123 Idaho 329 (1992). Mr. Jordan properly reviewed
this report and a large amount of other materials to render an opinion that the Claimant was
capable of returning to work and was not totally and permanently disabled.
The report of Dr. Nakintara is only one of numerous psychological evaluations contained
in the record. Her report noting that the Claimant would have no difficulty performing work
activities is consistent with other psychological reports, all of which indicate that a return to
work by the Claimant would actually be helpful.
Even if the Commission and Mr. Jordan were to completely ignore this psychological
report there is substantial evidence to support Mr. Jordan's opinion that the Claimant can return
to the workforce despite his psychological issues. Each of the psychologists involved say
Claimant's psychological condition would improve if he rejoined the workforce. Ronald Klein,
Ph.D., a Spokane, Washington, psychologist hired by the Surety, stated in 2008:
The panic attacks diagnosed by some are actually periodic anxiety symptoms
consistent with his longstanding adjustment disorder. He predictably functions
more poorly when out of work because .he does not have something outside of
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him to focus on ... the more time he spends out of work the more time he will feel
sorry for himself, obsessed about pain, and engage in more child like behaviors.
ISIP Ex. 4, p. 67.
Drs. Marie Parkman and Jennifer Rhodes also indicate Claimant had a personality
disorder not otherwise specified with histrionic and antisocial features. ISIP Ex. 15, p. 195. Their
report states as follows:
I have some concerns that what may be complicating this man's recovery is his
involvement in current ongoing litigation. It is unclear what the aim of the
litigation is and what Kevin hopes to accomplish with it. As is the case with many
people who become involved in this type of litigation, their lives do become
dysfunctional and paralyzed until the litigation is settled.
ISIF Ex. 15, p. 196.
Tim Rehnberg, Ph.D, a Moscow, Idaho, psychologist who was hired by the Claimant to
testify at the first hearing, indicated that the Claimant's prognosis was good if he would reenter
employment. Specifically, Dr. Rehnberg stated:
Mr. Smith's prognosis is good if he can reenter employment and regain some
financial stability as long as he is unemployed and struggling financially, he is
likely to have ongoing mood difficulties and somatic complaints.
Claimant's prior Ex. A-1.
Roger H. Ehlert, Ph.D. indicated that the Claimant was capable of managing his own
funds, understood written documents, and could follow treatment plans. He noted that he was of
at least average intelligence and had many strengths. Dr. Ehlert noted that he first came to see the
Claimant when he was in shock and deeply grieving relationship issues with his wife. Claimant's
Ex. R, p. 423.

F.

Functional Capacity Evaluation (FCE) Was Properly Considered

The Claimant argues that the Industrial Commission exceeded their authority in making
findings with respect to a functional capacity evaluation performed in March of 2014 at the
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request of Mr. Kelso himself. ISIP Ex. 14. The Claimant attacks the results of his own experts
FCE and even argued at one point that perhaps the FCE was done for a different person. The
FCE in this case is the only information available to the Commission related to the Claimant's
physical capacities that was even remotely close in time to the hearing date in 2016. The
Commission disregarded the unsigned return to work voucher, but considered the raw data
recorded as part of the functional capacity evaluation, including grip strength, shoulder and back
movement and ankle range of motion. Since the Claimant returned to California in 2012, there
was no updated medical information, other than the functional capacity evaluation.
The Referee and the Industrial Commission did not overstep its bounds in reviewing the
actual physical measurements recorded as part of the FCE. In Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse,
Inc., 154 Idaho 750 (2013) the Court held a referee could not form her own unqualified medical

opinion relying on evidence outside the record, including the DSM-IV-TR manual. The holding
in Mazzone is not applicable to the present case where the referee reviewed the results of the
Functional Capacity Evaluation that was admitted as an Exhibit at hearing. In Mazzone the
Court went on to hold that the error was harmless and noted that the Supreme Court will not
reverse the Industrial Commission when evidentiary errors are harmless. Hagler v. Micron
Technology, Inc., 118 Idaho 596 (1990).

The raw scores considered by the Commission (including upper extremity range of
motion, spine range of motion, lumbar spine range of motion, lower extremity range of motion,
right and left grip strength) all indicate an individual capable of performing the tested physical
activities. The Referee had every right to review the FCE results which were admitted as ISIF
Exhibit 14.
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III.

CONCLUSION

To recover benefits from ISIF, the claimant must satisfy the requirements of Idaho Code
Section 72-332(1). This Court has held that this requires the claimant to show: "(l) a preexisting impairment; (2) that pre-existing impairment was manifest; (3) that pre-existing
impairment was a subjective hindrance to employment; and (4) the pre-existing impairment and
the subsequent injury combined to result in total and permanent disability." Hope v. Indus.
Special Indemn. Fund, 157 Idaho 567, 571, 338 P.3d 546, 550 (2014); see Bybee, 129 Idaho at

80, 921 P.2d at 1204. Before apportioning liability to ISIF under Idaho Code Section 72-332,
there must be a finding that the claimant is totally and permanently disabled. Hope, 157 Idaho at
571, 338 P.3d at 550.
In this case there is substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission's
conclusion that Smith is not totally and permanently disabled. In fact, the only evidence of the
Claimant's disability is his own self-serving subjective complaints that he is unable to work.
There is substantial and competent evidence in this case to affirm the Industrial
Commission's decision that the Claimant did not meet his burden of proof on this issue of total
and permanent disability.
DATED this

iY

day of June, 2018.

JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

THOMAS W. CALLERY
Attorney for Defendant ISIF
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